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The Fifth Amendment's Takings 
Clause: New Twists to an 
Evolving Doctrine 
INTRODUCTION 
Whether a governmental action is a tak-
ing depends upon which taking test is 
applied to a case. There is no set taking 
standard by which an alleged taking is to 
be judged because the United States 
Supreme Court .has not yet established 
one. This paper will attempt to trace the 
history of the taking issue. This paper will 
also focus on Maryland's Chesapeake Bay 
Critical Area Legislation and its relation-
ship to the takings question. 
A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT'S TAKING THEORIES 
In order to properly evaluate the effect 
of governmental action as it relates to 
private property, a brief historical over-
view is necessary to explain the United 
States Supreme Court's approach to the 
question of what constitutes a taking of 
property. 
Eminent domain is the power of the 
government to take privately owned prop-
erty, upon the payment of adequate com-
pensation, to the use of the public benefit. 
This is different from the police power 
which refers to the inherent power of the 
government to take action in order to pre-
vent harm to the public health, safety, wel-
fare or morals (known as inverse 
condemnation).· A problem arises when 
governmental action via police power 
regulation is claimed to violate the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
by James E. Haupt, III 
ment.2 
The early test for a taking was formulated 
in J,fug/er '0. Kansas, 3 wherein the govern-
ment action must have been deemed an 
actual, physical, appropriation of the prop-
erty. In J,fug/er, a state statute prohibited 
the sale and manufacture of liquor for pur-
poses other than medical, scientific and 
mechanical uses. The breweries argued that 
their businesses were erected prior to the 
passage of the statute and, if the statute 
were to be applied to them, then their 
breweries would have little or no value. 
This argument did not sway the Court. 
The Court drew the distinction between 
the appropriation of property for the pub-
lic benefit (eminent domain) and the pre-
vention of a public harm (police power): 
The power which the states have of 
prohibiting such use by individuals of 
their property, as will be prejudicial to 
the health, the morals, or the safety of 
the public, is not [,] and ... cannot be 
[,J burdened with the condition that 
the state must compensate such indivi-
dual owners for pecuniary losses they 
may sustain, by reason of their not 
being permitted, by a noxious use of 
their property, to inflict injury upon 
the community.4 
The modern approach to takings was set 
forth in Pennsylvania Coal Co. '0. Mahon. 5 
In that case a coal company conveyed a 
tract of land to grantees yet reserved its 
right to remove coal from under the tract. 
Pennsylvania subsequently enacted a sta-
tute that prohibited the mining of coal in 
any manner that would cause subsidence 
of any structure used for human habita-
tion. The Supreme Court, in an opinion 
written by Justice Holmes, declared ·the 
statute to be an unconstitutional taking of 
the company's property. Holmes wrote: 
As long recognized, some values are 
enjoyed under an implied limitation 
and must yield to the police power. 
But obviously the implied limitation 
must have its limits, or the contract 
and due process clauses are gone. One 
fact for consideration in determining 
such limits is the extent of the diminu-
tion. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not all cases there must 
be an exercise of eminent domain and 
compensation to sustain the act.6 
Thus emerged the general rule that 
"while property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent, if the regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking."7 As a result 
of Mahon, the distinction between the 
state's exercise of eminent domain and the 
police power became blurred.8 
Since 1978, the Supreme Court has had 
an increasing number of opportunities to 
rule on regulatory takings dealing with 
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land use regulations. The first opportunity 
arose in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City9 where the owners of 
Grand Central Terminal challenged the 
New York City Landmark Preservation 
Law because of the Commission's rejec-
tion of plans for a 55-story highrise office 
building above the terminal. The Court 
held that the landmark designation did not 
constitute a taking because of the existence 
of transferable development rights. lo The 
decision, set forth factors that bear signifi-
cance regarding the taking question: 
[t]he economic impact of the regula-
tion on the claimant and particularly, 
the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations ... [and] the char-
acter of the governmental action. A 
"taking" may more readily be found 
when the interference with property 
can be characterized as a physical inva-
sion by government, than when inter-
ference arises from some public 
program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote 
the common good. II 
A taking cannot be claimed merely by 
showing that the landowner has been 
denied the ability to use his property in a 
manner that he had anticipated regarding 
its development. '2 In making the taking 
determination, the property is not ana-
lyzed by segments in order to ascertain 
whether a particular segment was taken, 
but rather, the governmental action is 
scrutinized according to "the nature and 
extent of the interference with rights in 
the parcel as a whole .... "13 
The next major taking issue addressed by 
the Supreme Court was in Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States. 14 In Kaiser, privately owned 
Kaupa pond was physically separated from 
a navigable bay and the Pacific Ocean by 
a barrier beach. The owners were advised 
by the Army Corps of Engineers that no 
permit was needed to convert the pond 
into a marina and connect it with the bay. 
As a result, the United States filed suit to 
determine if the Corps of Engineers' 
authority would include regulation of 
future improvements to the marina, and 
whether the owners could deny public 
access to the pond since the Corps con-
sidered the pond a "navigable water of the 
United States."15 
The Court held that the pond was a navi-
gable water and, therefore, subject to 
regulation by the Corps for any future 
improvements. '6 However, the pond 
through the navigable servitude did not 
automatically become a public aquatic 
park. "[T]he 'right to exclude' is universal-
ly held to be a fundamental element of the 
property right, .. , [and requires] that the 
Government cannot take without [just] 
compensation."'7 If the Corps' use of the 
navigational servitude was to create a pub-
lic park then it would "result in an actual 
physical invasion of the privately owned 
marina," 18 and hence be equivalent to a 
taking. 
The consequences of downgrading prop-
erty by a zoning ordinance which created 
open space preservation was at issue in 
Agins v. City of Tiburon. 19 The property 
owners bought five acres of unimproved 
land for residential development. Subse-
quently a zoning change permitted devel-
opment of one to five houses on the tract 
of land. The Court affirmed the Supreme 
Court of California's holding that the zon-
ing ordinance on its face did not constitute 
a taking.20 The Court found that the zon-
ing ordinances substantially advanced 
legitimate governmental goals while focus-
ing on protecting residents from the 
adverse affects of urbanization.21 Finding 
the ordinance constitutional because it 
allowed the best use of the property, the 
Court noted that the Agins could "pursue 
their reasonable investment expecta-
tions .... "22 
'"'all procedural and 
adminstrative 
remedies must be 
exhausted . .. " 
The dicta in the Agins opmlOn later 
became a major procedural hurdle for 
future petitioners to overcome before 
determining how an ordinance should be 
applied in a particular case. "Because the 
appellants have not submitted a plan for 
development of their property as the 
ordinances permit, there is as yet no con-
crete controversy regarding the applica-
tion of the specific zoning provisions."23 
Thus, all procedural and administrative 
remedies must be exhausted before assert-
ing a valid takings claim. 
Without doubt, however, the most con-
troversial takings issue was decided in San 
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego. 24 
This case also involved the downzoning of 
property. The city of San Diego changed 
local zoning, for part of the subject proper-
ty, from industrial to agricultural and 
established an "open-space" plan. The 
takings issue was never reached because 
the Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, concluded 
that the California Court of Appeals had 
not decided whether any taking had in fact 
occurred. Therefore, since there was no 
final decision, the Court did not have juris-
diction to review the appeal.25 
The controversy surrounding San Diego 
Gas & Electric Co. stems from Justice Bren-
nan's dissent, wherein he stated that 
"[p]olice power regulations such as zoning 
ordinances and other land-use restrictions 
can destroy the use and enjoyment of 
property to promote the public good just 
as effectively as formal condemnation or 
physical invasion of property."26 Justice 
Brennan concluded that a de facto exercise 
of the power of eminent domain could 
result where the effects of the government 
action "completely deprive the owner of 
all or most of his interest in the proper-
ty."27 
Under Brennan's proposed rule, mone-
tary damages would be constitutionally 
required once a court established that 
there was a regulatory taking. According 
to Justice Brennan, the Constitution de-
mands that the government pay just com-
pensation for the period commencing on 
the date the regulation first effects the tak-
ing and ending on the date the government 
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the 
regulation.28 Not only did Justice Brennan 
make it clear that those harmed by a regu-
latory taking could receive monetary 
damages, he also proposed that even 
though a regulatory taking may be tempo-
rary it still would amount to a constitu-
tional taking. 29 
After San Diego Gas & Electric Co., the 
Court seemed to return to its more tradi-
tional theory of an actual physical intru-
sion as a result of government action. In 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV 
Corp.,30 the Court again held that a statute 
authorizing a permanent physical occupa-
tion of private property constituted a tak-
ing.31 
Some recent decisions by the Supreme 
Court have focused on procedural or 
jurisdictional holdings regarding finality of 
the case rather than confronting the consti-
tutional question of whether a taking has 
occurred. In Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 32 
"[b]ecause respondent hard] not yet ob-
tained a final decision regarding applica-
tion of the zoning ordinance and 
subdivision regulations to its property, nor 
utilized the procedures Tennessee pro-
vide[d] for obtaining just compensa-
tion,"33 the Court reversed and remanded, 
holding that the claim was not ripe for 
appeal. 
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Respondent did submit a plan for devel-
oping the property and the planning com-
mission rejected the proposal, but instead 
of following through with other remedies 
(seeking variances from either the Board of 
Zoning Appeals or the Commission) 
respondent filed suit. There had not been 
any determination that respondent had 
been "denied all reasonable beneficial use 
of its property, and therefore ... " there 
was no final decision.34 
In United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 35 the Corps of Engineers filed 
suit alleging that the disputed property 
constituted wetlands. The issue centered 
on the 1977 Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act amendment's, definition of 
'waters of the United States,' (See 33 
U.S.c. 1, 1344). The Supreme Court held 
that neither the requirement for nor the 
denial of a dredge and fill permit in and of 
itself is a taking, since "there may be other 
viable uses available to the owner."36 In a 
footnote the Court indicated that respon-
dent may have a temporary taking claim as 
a result of the Corps' denial of the fill per-
mit, but, under the Tucker Act, 28 U .S.c. 
§ 1491, the property owner should 
"initiate a suit for compensation in the 
Claims Court."37 
In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo 
County,38 Appellant sought to subdivide 
property into 159 single-family and multi-
fanlily residential lots. The Yolo County 
Planning Commission rejected this plan 
on grounds that the proposal failed to pro-
vide adequate public street access, sewer 
services, water supplies, and police protec-
tion. Finding that all administrative proce-
dures had not been exhausted and holding 
that the complaint failed to state cause of 
action upon which relief could be 
granted,39 the Court declined to reach the 
taking issue, because the "appellant has 
submitted one subdivision proposal and 
has received the Board's response thereto. 
Nevertheless, appellant still has yet to 
receive the Board's final, definitive posi-
tion regarding how it will apply the regula-
tions at issue to the particular land in 
question."40 There thus exists the possibili-
ty that some development may be permit-
ted, but until a final determination is 
reached as to whether a taking has oc-
curred, the taking issue will not be address-
ed.41 
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided 
three taking cases. Controversy surround-
ed two of the cases because of the Court's 
vacillation as to which taking test the 
Court would apply in a given case. The 
least controversial taking issue was 
addressed in Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 42 In Keystone, Section 
4 of Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Sub-
sidence and Land Conservation Act (Act) 
was challengedY The Act prohibited min-
ing that causes subsidence damage44 to 
public buildings, dwellings, and 
cemeteries.45 The statute was analyzed by 
deciding whether it substantially advanced 
a legitimate state interest and whether it 
denied the owner an economically viable 
use of his land.46 
In deciding the first issue, the Court ana-
lyzed the legislative purpose as specifically 
stated in Section 2 of the Subsidence Act. 
The Act is "for the protection of the 
health, safety and general welfare ... by 
providing for the conservation of surface 
lands areas which may be affected in the 
mining of bituminous coal," to preserve 
water drainage and supplies, and "general-
ly to improve the use and enjoyment of 
such lands .... "47 Where the public 
interest is to prevent an activity which is 
similar to a public nuisance, then compen-
sation is precluded. In this case, "[t]he Sub-
sidence Act ... plainly seeks to further 
such an interest."48 
CCcompensation for a 
temporary taking 
was addressed in 
First English ... " 
Turning to the second issue, the Court 
in Keystone found that Petitioner failed to 
prove any substantial economic loss. Peti-
tioner's suit was based on the theory that 
the Act, on its face, was a taking. Howev-
er, no evidence was produced concerning 
the effect of the Act on Petitioner's mining 
operation. The Court applied both a 
diminution of value and reasonable benefi-
cial use test, and found under each analysis 
that there was no taking because Keystone 
was not deprived of enough of its property 
to prove a taking.49 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court looked at the amount of 
coal that petitioners could not mine in 
relation to the amount of coal it could 
mine. The coal amounted to 27 million 
tons, representing only 2% of the entire 
coal deposit.50 
The question of compensation for a tem-
porary taking was addressed in First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles. 51 In First 
English, the church had a campground 
known as Lutherglen which was destroyed 
by a flood. As a result of the flood damage, 
Los Angeles County adopted Ordinance 
No. 11,855 in order to preserve the public 
health and safety.52 The ordinance prohi-
bited any type of construction, reconstruc-
tion or enlargement of any building 
located within the interim flood protec-
tion area.53 Petitioner filed suit claiming it 
lost all use of Lutherglen and sought 
damages as relief. Both the trial court and 
the California Court of Appeals struck 
this allegation holding that the California 
Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. 
Tiburon54 precluded compensation for a 
temporary taking of property until after 
the issue was decided by way of declara-
tory relief or mandamus.55 
The Court made only a limited holding 
because two questions, whether the ques-
tioned ordinance actually denied appellant 
all of its property and whether any denial 
of such use may be allowed under the 
State's authority to enact safety regula-
tions, remained unanswered.56 According 
to the Court, the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution requires compensation 
to run from the time a regulation takes 
effect and "no subsequent action by the 
government can relieve it of the duty to 
provide compensation for the period dur-
ing which the taking was effective."57 
In First English, the allegations in the 
complaint were treated as true for the pur-
pose of Supreme Court review. Thus, it 
was "assume[d] that the Los Angeles 
County ordinances ... denied appellant 
all use of its property for a considerable 
period of years and . . . invalida-
tion . . . without payment of fair value 
for the use of the property during this 
period of time would be a constitutionally 
insufficient remedy."58 
As a result of the Court's decision, the 
church had to prove that either the 
ordinance deprived it of all reasonable use 
during the time period, causing more than 
a mere diminution of value59 or the restric-
tions on its property were such that the 
general public enjoyed a benefit' greater 
than the burden placed on the property 
owner.60 On the other hand, the county 
could defeat the church's taking allegation 
by proving that the church did not lose all 
reasonable uses of the property61 or the 
effect of the statute was to prevent a public 
harm which outweighed any incon-
venience to the property owner. 62 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commis· 
sion, 63 involved a request for a building 
permit by the Nollans to replace their 
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small beachfront bungalow with a much 
larger structure. The permit was granted 
by the Commission upon the condition 
that an easement be gra."1ted to the state 
which would allow the public lateral 
access across Nollan's beachfront property 
along the shoreline.64 Because of the "lack 
of [a] nexus between the condition and the 
original purpose of the building restric-
tion[,] ... the permit condition ... [was] 
not a valid regulation of land use .... "65 
The majority rejected the Commission's 
finding that the new house would interfere 
with "visual access to the beach."66 
Instead, the Court held that any asserted 
public interest in a strip of beach must be 
accomplished by eminent domain and not 
by use of a permit system.67 
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, 
argued that the majority erroneously ana-
lyzed the case. Brennan believed that this 
was not a case of physical intrusion by the 
state, but instead a rational exercise of a 
state's police power.68 Even if a more exac-
ting match is required, Brennan argued 
"the impression that the beach is not open 
to the public - is thus directly alleviated by 
the provision for public access over the 
dry sand."69 
The Nollan case is similar to First English 
in that the petitioner may have won the 
battle, but not the war. Despite the 
Court's holding that the permit may not 
be conditioned with the easement require-
ment, Nollan may still lose control over 
the beach if a later trial court determines 
that the public has obtained a prescriptive 
right to the beach.7° 
TESTS APPLIED BY THE COURTS 
What has evolved over the years as a 
result of the preceeding Supreme Court 
decisions seems to be a general state of con-
fusion regarding the applicable test in a 
taking case. While this may be true in that 
the Court has not stated "this will be the 
test," what has evolved are various stan-
dards which the Court can apply, depend-
ing upon the facts of a particular case. The 
Court has not strayed from the general dis-
tinctions between eminent domain and 
police power regulations in that any physi-
cal entry will be subject to eminent 
domain rules and analysis and thus could 
require just compensation.? I Essentially, 
four tests have evolved to decide taking by 
regulation cases: (1) diminution in value; 
(2) reasonable beneficial use; (3) creation or 
prevention of harm; and (4) burden and 
benefit. 
DIMINUTION OF VALUE 
The diminution of value test was estab-
lished in Mahon and "requires compensa-
tion only if the value of the land is 
excessively diminished .... "72 
The analysis focuses on two points. 
First, does the statute or regulation serve a 
valid public purpose? Second, if there is a 
valid public purpose, what is its effect on 
this particular property? Thus, under this 
first test a property owner must lose all use 
of the property in order to prevail. 
REASONABLE BENEFICIAL USE 
The reasonable beneficial use test analyzes 
the facts of a particular case so as to ascer-
tain if the property owner has any other 
use of the property under the regulation. 
Generally, if some other use can be found, 
the court will often find no taking.73 
Therefore, under the reasonable benefi-
cial use test, if a property owner is seeking 
to use the property to the fullest extent 
possible, a court can find no taking. Addi-
tionally, as long as a property owner has 
some reasonable use no taking will be 
found. 
CREATION OR PREVENTION 
OF HARM 
Consideration of the statute's or regula-
tion's effect is the focus of the second test. 
If the statute has the intended purpose of 
preventing a public danger, or harm to the 
public interest then it is seen as a police 
power regulation.?4 
"four tests have 
evolved to decide 
taking by 
regulation .. " 
The third test embraces the prevention 
of environmental degradation as a basis of 
its reasoning. If a property owner's plan 
would detrimentally change the natural 
environment then the request would be 
denied. Thus, the state would be using the 
police power to prevent a harm to the 
entire society. 
BURDEN AND BENEFIT 
The last test considers whether the 
restrictions imposed upon the property 
owner allow the general public to enjoy 
the benefits of the protected resource.75 In 
order for a plaintiff to succeed in this type 
of case, he has the responsibility of show-
ing that the burden on his property ex-
ceeds the normal requirements of a zoning 
regulation. 
Thus, the fourth test has more of a bal-
ancing formula as its focus. Both property 
owners and society must balance their re-
spective rights. When one party attempts 
to place too great a burden on the other 
party, then this extra benefit accruing to 
the other party will be disallowed. 
SUMMARY 
What then do these tests mean? How are 
they to be applied in a possible taking case? 
Perhaps, the four tests could be consoli-
dated into two. First, the diminution of 
value and reasonable beneficial use tests are 
both very similar in that for a plaintiff to 
succeed under the diminution of value test 
he must prove that he has lost all possible 
use of his property. Under the reasonable 
beneficial use test, the court, in order not 
to find a taking, need only recognize that 
the property has some minimal use. There-
fore, using the above reasoning, a taking 
under the police powers would only occur 
when the regulation deprives the landown-
er of all reasonable use of his property. 
This theory is very anti-property owner 
because some minimal use could probably 
be found in every case. 
Second, the last two tests could also be 
combined. The harm test looks at the 
property in its natural character and any 
drastic change to that natural state is con-
sidered harmful to the environment and 
the surrounding ecosystem. The burden 
and benefit test has as its basis a balancing 
of the burden the regulation places on the 
owner versus the benefit the state or gener-
al public receives by leaving the property 
in its natural state. Consequently, a taking 
would not occur where the purpose of the 
regulation is to preserve the land in its 
natural state, unless the regulation puts too 
great a burden on the owner to keep the 
land in its organic form. Therefore, some 
form of tax credits or other benefits accru-
ing to the property owner could help to 
lessen this burden and avoid a taking 
without just compensation problem. 
CHESAPEAKE BAY 
CRITICAL AREA LEGISlATION 
AND THE TAKING TESTS 
In 1984, the Maryland General 
Assembly added to Maryland National 
Resources Code Annotated Title 8, Water 
and Water Resources subtitle 18, 
Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection 
Program 55 8-1801 et. seq. The stated pur-
pose was to "[e]stablish a Resource Protec-
tion Program '" by fostering more sen-
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sltive development activity for certain 
shoreline areas so as to minimize damage 
to water quality and natural habitats; and 
[i]mplement the ... [p]rogram on a coop-
erative basis between the State and affected 
local governments .... "76 
The Chesapeake Bay Critical Area con-
sists of: 
(1) [a]ll waters of land under the 
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries to 
the head of tide as indicated on the 
State wetlands maps, and all State and 
private wetlands designated under 
Title 9 of this article; and 
(2) [a]ll land and water areas within 
1,000 feet beyond the landward bound-
aries of State or private wetlands and 
the heads of tides designated under 
Title 9 of this article.77 
With the enactment of this legislation, 
landowners who wished to develop their 
property were faced with another pre-
development requirement which stated 
that: 
[T]he approving authority of the local 
jurisdiction in rendering its decision to 
approve an application shall make 
findings that: 
(1) [t]he proposed development will 
minimize adverse impact on water 
quality ... and; 
(2) ... has identified fish, wildlife, 
and plant habitat which may be 
adversely affected ... and has designed 
the development ... to protect those 
identified habitats ... .78 
As a result of this section, the Act would 
seem to be open for a challenge that it is a 
taking on its face. Maryland case law does 
not give a prospective plaintiff much hope. 
In Potomac Sand,79 plaintiff was denied the 
ability to dredge, take and carry away sand 
and gravel from the tidal waters or marshes 
of Charles County. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that the Act was not an 
unconstitutional taking on its face because 
"Chapter 792 has an ecological purpose. 
As has been shown, the protection of 
exhaustible natural resources is a valid 
exercise of the police powers."80 
In light of a possible suit under a taking 
theory, the Critical Areas legislation 
should be analyzed under the four general-
ly accepted tests used by the Supreme 
Court. According to the diminution of 
value test, a plaintiff must prove that the 
land has lost all valuable use. Section 8-
1813,81 comes closest to possibly depriving 
a landowner of all possible use. This is not 
necessarily the case since a property owner 
might be denied the highest and best use, 
but not all use. 
The reasonable beneficial use test which 
requires analysis directed to whether or 
not the owner has any other use for the 
property would apply to two sections of 
the Act. The first section (8-1808(c) Ele-
ments of Program), does not disallow all 
uses because zoning could be changed that 
would allow for other economic useS.82 
The second section (8-1809(g) Proposed 
Amendments) allows the local jurisdic-
tions to propose amendments, which must 
be approved by the Commission according 
to the standards set forth by the legisla-
tion.B3 Thus, the restrictions on develop-
ment would not be permanent. 
The best argument the state could use in 
a taking suit would be under the third test, 
prevention of harm. The title of the legisla-
tion speaks for itself as to the intent of the 
Act, "Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Pro· 
tection Program." (emphasis added). Sec-
tion 8-1801 (Declaration of Public Policy) 
includes findings by the General Assembly 
which in essence declare that the 
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries have 
been and continue to be harmed by human 
activity. As a result of the deterioration of 
the Chesapeake Bay, the intent of the Act 
is to minimize any future adverse 
impacts.84 
CCthe restrictions on 
development would 
not be permanent." 
The burden and benefit test could also 
be used by the state because "[t]he quality 
of life for the citizens of Maryland is 
enhanced through the restoration of the 
quality and productivity of the waters of 
the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries."85 
Continuing under subsection nine, the Act 
recites that "[t]here is a critical and sub-
stantial State interest for the benefit of cur-
rent and future generations in fostering 
more sensitive development activity ... so 
as to minimize damage to water quality 
and natural habitats."86 
There is no doubt that all the citizens of 
Maryland will benefit in the prevention of 
future damage to the Chesapeake Bay and 
its tributaries. Looking at the law on its 
face, there does not seem to be any extra 
burden on a landowner since the program 
anticipates "policies for development in 
the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area which 
accomodates growth .... "87 
Therefore, the probability that the Act 
on its face would be declared unconstitu-
tional as a taking without just compensa-
tion seems very remote. However, that 
does not rule out the possibility of indivi-
dual law suits challenging the Act as 
applied to a specific situation. Estimating 
the possible success of such a suit without 
specific facts would be very presumptuous 
at this stage. The Act appears to have an 
answer for each of the taking theories, 
however, any final interpretation rests 
with the Maryland Court of Appeals and 
possibly the United States Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Supreme Court decided, in 
Mahon that a "regulation that goes too far 
will be recognized as a taking," the courts 
and the legal community have not yet 
been able to define what constitutes 
unreasonable infringement of property 
rights. The police power of the state is 
used to protect and prevent harm to the 
public health, safety, welfare and morals of 
society. Environmental regulation is the 
most recent extension of the police power. 
Since the 1970's, the judiciary has been 
more willing to uphold police power 
regulatory legislation because of newly cul-
tivated public concern with the environ-
ment and man's interrelationship with 
nature. 
Maryland's Chesapeake Bay Critical 
Area legislation is another attempt to 
assuage the damage caused by man's past 
greed and disregard for natural resources. 
Unless the Act denies a property owner of 
total use of his land, the Critical Area pro-
gram will probably not be considered a tak-
ing without just compensation. 
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